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Abstract — The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed many 
aspects of modern manufacturing, from design to production to 
quality inspection. In particular, IoT and digital manufacturing 
technol-ogies have substantially accelerated product development-
cycles and manufacturers can now create products of a complexity 
and precision not heretofore possible. However, new threats to 
supply chain security have arisen from connecting machines to the 
In-ternet and introducing complex IoT-based systems controlling 
manufacturing processes. By attacking these IoT-based manu-
facturing systems and tampering with digital files, attackers can 
manipulate physical characteristics of parts and change the di-
mensions, shapes, or mechanical properties of the parts, which can 
result in parts that fail in the field. These defects increase 
manufacturing costs and allow silent problems to occur only un-
der certain loads that can threaten safety and/or lives. To under-
stand potential dangers and protect manufacturing system integ-
rity, this paper presents two taxonomies: one for classifying 
cyber-physical attacks against manufacturing processes and an-
other for quality inspection measures for counteracting these 
attacks. We systematically identify and classify possible cyber-
physical attacks and connect the attacks with variations in 
manufacturing processes and quality inspection measures. Our 
taxonomies also provide a scheme for linking emerging IoT-based 
manufacturing system vulnerabilities to possible attacks and 
quality inspection measures.
Keywords — Cyber-physical attack, Computer-aided 
Manufacturing, Cyber-physical system, Internet of Things.
I. IntroductIon
tHE Internet of Things (IoT) embeds electronics, software, and sensors into physical objects that collect and exchange data via 
network connections. IoT technologies have made manufactur ing 
smarter by enabling manufacturing systems to evolve from loose collec-
tions of largely disjoint cyber and physical components into synergis-
tic cyber-physical systems. The Internet-connected sensors, tooling, 
and control systems forming these IoT-based manufacturing systems 
enable the manufacturing and refinement of parts that previously were 
hard to produce cost-effectively. 
The IoT plays an important role in improving the efficiency and 
productivity of manufactur ing systems. For example, by connecting 
digital manufacturing technologies and Com puter-Aided Engineering 
(CAE) tools, designers and manu facturing engineers can substantially 
accelerate the prod uct development-cycle. The use of IoT-based 
manufactur ing sys tems, however, also expands opportunities for 
cyber-physical attacks against these systems. In particular, older pre-
IoT equip ment was not Internet-accessible and thus not exposed to 
cyber-attack like newer IoT-based manufacturing equipment.
For instance, with IoT-based manufacturing systems, critical 
manufacturing files are stored in computers connected to the Internet, 
as shown in Fig. 1. It is possible for an attacker across the Internet to 
remotely intercept and alter design files or ma chine con figura tions to 
create undetectable changes in a part that adversely affect a product’s 
design intent, performance, or qual ity [1], [2], [3], [4]. Since the parts 
being attacked are in stalled in automo biles, jet engines, or artificial 
heart valves, the results could financially devastat e manufacturers, e.g., 
by damag ing equip ment, incurring property losses, increasing warranty 
costs, losing customer trust, or threating human safety if these altered 
parts function improperly and fail in the field [2].
Fig. 1. Computers with Internet Connection in Manufacturing Systems.
A fundamental concern with IoT-based manufacturing sys tems is 
that they enable the monitoring and control of previ ously non-remotely 
accessible physical systems. If these Inter net-connected IoT devices 
are not protected, the physi cal sys tems that they influence, such as 
the parts that a manufacturing facility produces, may be damaged. A 
famous example of criti cal IoT-based infrastructure being attacked is 
the Stuxnet mal ware that damaged nearly one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear 
centrifuges [5]. The Stuxnet malware targeted pro grammable logic 
control lers and forced physical equip ment to operate outside its design 
tolerances and led to centrifuge failures. 
Past IoT security research has explored cyber-vulnerabilities in 
industrial control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisi tion (SCADA) controllers [6], which can force physical systems 
to operate outside of their safety tolerances. While these control systems 
are a crucial area of research, IoT-based manu factur ing systems are 
also vulnerable to silent attacks that result in a manufactured part’s 
physical characteris tics no longer matching their design specifica tions, 
which could lead to critical and/or pre-mature failures in the field. 
Similar research has looked at flaws injected into com puter hardware 
and soft ware logic [7], [8]. Much less research, however, has focused 
on flaws injected into the physical parts themselves, which have no 
computational logic.
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In contrast to traditional cyber-security, IoT-based manufacturing 
systems use physical equipment, which generates measurable 
phenomena (e.g., temperatures and vibrations) to produce physical 
products that can be inspected and tested to determine if they meet their 
requirements. In addition, a particularly vexing challenge of IoT-based 
manufacturing sys tems is that their underlying software and hardware 
is rarely updated [1], [2], [3]. This lack of updates leaves complex 
IoT-based manufacturing equipment exposed and vulnerable to attack 
on the Internet. Moreover, this update problem cannot be easily 
addressed, as IoT-based manufacturing equipment is often ex tremely 
costly to purchase, amortized over decades, and very expen sive to take 
out of production operation. Techniques and tools are therefore needed 
to help protect the physical parts that IoT-based manufacturing systems 
produce, while recognizing that these systems will al ways be at risk of 
cyber-attacks.
Fortunately, cyber-physical attacks against an IoT-based 
manufacturing system are unique in having correlated cyber and 
physical manifestation of the attack in the manufactured part. This 
correla tion can be used to model and predict the relationships between 
attacks, process data, product quality observations, and side-channel 
impacts for the purpose of attack detection and diagnosis. 
Hence, the work pre sented in this paper helps answer the following 
ques tions: 
•	 What types of attacks are particular IoT-based manufacturing sys-
tem processes vulnerable to? 
•	 What facets of a part can be attacked in a given IoT-based 
manufacturing system? 
•	 What quality inspection mechanisms could be put in place to lower 
risk in IoT-based manufacturing systems? 
•	 How can quality inspection and side channel measure ments 
mitigate cyber-vulnerabilities in IoT-based manufacturing sys tem? 
•	 How does a newly disclosed cyber vulnerability impact a particular 
IoT-based manufacturing process? 
To answer these questions, we have created two taxonomies: one 
for classifying cyber-physical attacks against IoT-based manufacturing 
pro cesses and another for quality inspection measures for counteract-
ing these attacks. These taxonomies catalog IoT-based manu facturing 
processes, attacks, and quality inspection measures, as well as 
model the relationship between specific attack types, vulnerabili ties, 
equipment, processes, and quality inspection measures. They also help 
to bridge the gap be tween (1) the IoT cyber domain, where the research 
subjects are cyber infra struc ture and software vulnerabilities, and (2) 
the physical do main, which includes manufacturing processes and 
quality inspection  measures. 
Our taxonomies provide a framework that researchers and prac-
titioners from both cyber-security and IoT-based manufactur ing can 
use and augment to understand the scope of cyber vulnerabilities, how 
these vulnerabilities impact different pro cesses, the types of cyber 
attributes that these attacks express, and their impacts on the physical 
properties of both the process execution and physi cal part outputs. 
This framework makes it easier to make decisions on cyber-physical 
security in manufacturing, catalog attacks and vulnerabilities as they 
emerge, and under stand the relation ship between specific attack types, 
equipment, pro cesses, and side-channel impacts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes the taxonomies for the manufacturing process, cyber-
physical attacks, and quality inspection measures; Section III explores 
a case study of a manufacturing industry partner using the proposed 
taxonomy; Section IV compares our research with related work; and 
Section V presents concluding remarks and future work.
II. taxonomIEs
Our overarching goal is to connect vulnerabilities, IoT-based 
manufacturing processes, cyber-physical attacks and quality inspection 
measures all together, as we show in Fig. 2. The characteristics of the 
IoT-based manufacturing processes reveal the vulnerabilities that could 
be exposed, which would then determine what cyber-physical attacks 
could be launched. Each cyber-physical attack has its effects either in 
the physical domain or the cyber domain. We can choose the quality 
inspection measures that could capture the provisioned attack effects, 
thereby enabling better defenses against cyber-physical attacks in IoT-
based manufacturing systems.
Fig. 2.  Logic Flow in Manufacturing Processes.
A. Overview of Manufacturing Processes
Manufacturing systems are rarely the same for differ ent types of 
manufactured products, but most of these systems share a simi lar 
work flow. A manufacturing system typically starts with product design, 
then procures raw material, goes through various manufacturing 
processes, followed by assembly and inspection for quality control, 
and finally distribution of the products, as shown in Fig. 3. Our 
taxonomies focus on the chain of process steps ranging from de sign to 
manufacturing with its different operations to inspection only, without 
considering other steps such as raw material procurement and 
distribution.  
A key differentiator between IoT-based manu facturing sys tems 
and traditional systems is that the former operate more like distrib-
uted software-reliant systems than the latter. Tradi tional manufacturing 
systems use significant numbers of manual steps and closed/locally 
managed control systems. Newer IoT-based manufacturing systems 
are remotely accessi ble and monitorable by designers, reconfigurable, 
and capture volumes of sensor and tool actuation data during operation. 
Moreover, these systems are driven by computer instructions that coordi-
nate their constitu ent IoT sensors and tooling to produce a given part.
Since IoT-based manufacturing processes perform the set of steps 
through which raw materials are transformed into a fin ished product, 
Fig.	3.	Workflow	of	Manufacturing	System.
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this sub-section summarizes the basic and most com monly used 
manufacturing processes in industry today. In production systems, a 
combina tion of several processes may be required to manufacture a 
product, but understanding the charac teristics of the essential and most 
common processes is important to build accurate taxonomies.
There are several methods [9], [10] [11] to classify the different 
manufacturing processes involved in production, such as divid ing them 
into the two main groups shown in Fig. 4: 
1. Processing operations, which add value to materials by 
transforming them from one state to an other. Process 
operations can be further divided into solidification processes 
(such as casting that pours material in a cavity to fill when 
it cools down), deformation processes (such as form ing that 
changes the shape of the material, without usually changing its 
original volume), subtractive processes (such as machining that 
changes the shape of the material through re moving some of 
it, thereby decreasing its volume), additive processes (such as 
3D printing that builds the shape of the material progressively 
by accumulating thin layers one on top of the other), surface 
processing (such as surface finish ing done as a final step to 
improve the quality of the sur face of the current product), and 
others (such as heat treat ment, which enhances the property of 
the material itself, and partic ulate processing, where particles 
are consolidated to gether).
2. Joining operations, which bring two or more components 
together. Joining operations can be split into permanent 
joining processes (such as welding) and joining via mechanical 
components (such as fasteners). 
An overview of such grouping can be seen in Fig. 4, along with some 
(non-exhaustive) examples for each sub-group. These sub-groups are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, e.g., a subtrac tive process may also 
be performed during surface processing opera tions. 
Another concept we define is “part facet”, which is a specific 
aspect or geometric structure of a part that is important to its 
performance. The facet type includes dimension (e.g., length, width, 
height, radius, etc.), weight, center of gravity, color, magnetism, 
surface roughness, tensile strength, yield strength, etc. Each 
manufacturing process is restricted by its characteristics, so it can 
only affect a subset of the part facets. For example, a turning process 
can change the dimensions of the part. Like wise, a heat treatment can 
change the yield strength of the part.
B. Design Artifacts to Code
An interesting facet of IoT-based manufacturing is that design 
files, such as solid geometry representations of parts, are eventu-
ally translated into computer instructions, such as G-Code, for a set 
of IoT machines indicating how to manufac ture the part [12]. This 
process is a form of model-driven engi neering, which is also used in 
software development [13]. Many of the attacks are analyzed based on 
the instruction set limita tions of manufactur ing equipment, which are 
directly connected to the physical capabilities of the equipment, and 
provide cyber-physical bounds on attacks. 
Due to the wide range of IoT-based manufacturing processes, this 
paper only concentrates on subtractive and additive pro cesses, which 
serve as representatives of a larger group due to the fact that they are 
currently being used heavily in IoT environ ments. For example, in Com-
puter Aided Manufactur ing (CAM) the prod ucts within these processes 
are created through Com puter Aided Design (CAD) software. The 
design is then realized by coordination of Computer Numerically Con-
trolled (CNC) machines or 3D printers through a network and driven 
by com puter programmed commands, rather than being controlled by 
hand. Such extensive use and reliance on IoT devices and soft ware 
systems invites new cyber-physical threats. Due to the wide range of 
IoT-based manufacturing processes, this paper only concentrates on 
subtractive and additive pro-cesses, which serve as representatives of 
a larger group due to the fact that they are currently being used heavily 
in IoT environments1. 
While subtractive and additive processes are significantly different, 
their integration into an IoT-based manufacturing system is relatively 
1 The attack taxonomy presented in Section II.C can also be applied 
to other manufacturing processes.
Fig.	4.		Manufacturing	Processes	Classification	with	Examples.
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similar. Fig. 5 shows modern process chains for both an additive and 
a subtractive process, respec tively. The process chain starts with a 
3D CAD model, which is the digital representa tion of the shape and 
dimensions of an artifact. 
Fig. 5.  Process Chains for Subtractive and Additive Manufacturing.
For subtractive manufacturing, the 3D CAD model goes di rectly 
to CAM software as modern CAD/CAM systems are integrated. After 
the CAM step is completed, a generic toolpath file is generated and 
sent to the IoT machine’s controllers. In the process chains shown in 
Fig. 1, users have ready access to the toolpath, which provides a set of 
instructions for the tool regard ing its direction, speed, and path. 
In additive manufacturing, the CAD model is usually translated 
into an intermediary file format called an “STL” file, which represents 
the solid geometry with a list of triangu-lar facets that define a part’s 
surface. Using machine-specific CAM software, this STL file is virtually 
sliced into layers that will be printed. Another algorithm generates 
commands (such as G-Code) that determine the additive manufacturing 
machine-specific toolpath to process each layer. This toolpath is 
generated locally on the machine or sent to a 3D printer’s controllers 
across a network. These IoT systems allow designers to remotely print 
and monitor progress of different parts across the Internet.
In IoT-based manufacturing, each component of these pro cess 
chains are linked through the IoT infrastructure, which poses poten tial 
risks of external cyber-physical attacks. In fact, two case studies [2], [3] 
conducted recently at Virginia Tech showed how to target a different 
component in each chain, as highlighted red in Fig. 5. In the case of 
the additive manufacturing pro cess, a cyber-physical attack modified 
the STL file to create a part with an internal void [3]. In the case of the 
subtractive manufac turing process commands in the machine toolpaths 
were altered, thereby producing an incorrect part [2]. 
Examining the process chains of both additive and subtrac tive 
manufactur ing demonstrates how vulnerable modern manu facturing is 
to cyber-physical attacks, e.g.:
•	 Both the STL and toolpath files are plain text with out any 
encryption or encoding, which means these files can be inter cepted 
and tampered/replaced. By modifying these files, attackers can 
bring parts out of specifications, add undesired part features, or 
alter part mechanical proper ties.
•	 An attack can propagate through an entire process chain. For 
example, altering a CAD file in transit across a network be tween 
IoT components will result in changes in the trans lated STL/
toolpath file. If attacks cannot be pre vented in previous processes, 
any quality inspection measures in later pro cesses are meaningless.
C. A Taxonomy of Cyber-physical attacks against Manufactur-
ing Processes
In this sub-section, we describe possible types of cyber-physical 
attacks against manufacturing system processes in IoT environments. 
An attack can be charac ter ized by an attack flow where attackers first 
probe for a cyber vulnerability within the system, then exploit it with 
an appropriate attack vector to target a specific component within the 
manufacturing environment, producing a corresponding impact in 
form of a resulting attack. An example of an attack vector can be seen 
highlighted in red in Fig. 6, which also shows they key elements within 
an attack flow that could be described as follows: 
(1) Vulnerabilities in the IoT-based manufacturing system can 
include a com-promised worker, OS/Software vulnerability, or 
weak authen-tication mechanism. 
(2) Attack Vectors refer to paths where attackers can gain 
unauthorized access to the IoT system. Possible attack vectors 
include social engineering, malware like viruses or Trojans, 
insufficient authenti cation (attackers can get permission by 
brute force or bypass authentication), etc. 
(3) Attack Targets are the actual assets (cyber or physical) being 
targeted by the attack. They can be manufactured products, the 
IoT machines used for manufacturing, or intellectual property, 
such as CAD design files or specifications.
(4) Attack Impacts result in different possible attack types, 
depending on the attack target. Those can be classified into 
three categories: 
•	 Confidentiality attacks compromise the intellectual property 
of files, such as design model files. Design models may be 
highly confidential since they represent valuable business 
secrets for manufacturing companies. If these files are stolen 
by competitors and are used to reproduce similar products, 
substantial economic loss can be incurred for the company.
•	 Availability attacks affect the availability of manufacturing 
resources as they target manufacturing machines and tools. 
These attacks could deliberately slow down manufacturing 
processes by breaking down the controlling computers or 
damaging the manufacturing machines. 
•	 Integrity attacks tamper with design models or configuration 
files of a manufacturing product line, thereby changing the 
geometric dimensions or mechanical properties of a part so it 
does not meet its designed requirements.
Based on the attack target, integrity attacks can be further 
categorized into material attacks and struc ture attacks, which are all 
shown in Fig. 6.
Material attacks are attacks that change the physical properties, 
such as material strength, surface roughness, color or magnetism of the 
manufacturing parts.
Structure attacks can change the following four types of geometric 
dimensions of manufacturing parts, as illustrated in [3]: 
1. Scaling: a part is scaled up or down in one or more dimensions, 
resulting in various outcomes. For example, the part may 
no longer fit into other components or the part’s mechanical 
properties may change by decreasing its strength.
2. Vertex movement: Some vertexes of a part have moved, which 
may not always change the part’s external dimensions but alters 
the coordinates of certain vertexes internally. Vertex movement 
could result in fit issues or a change of mechanical properties. 
3. Indents/protrusions: small indents or protrusions can be created 
on the surface of a part, resulting in fit issues or rough surface 
finish.
4. Internal void: a small volume created inside a part is not easily 
detectable by visual inspection since the void is completely 
enclosed. The void does not change the dimensions of a part. 
The void can impact a part’s mechanical properties, e.g., if 
placed in a load bearing location, the void can make the part 
fail more easily. Additive manufacturing can create internal 
voids due to its layer-by-layer building process, but subtractive 
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manufactur-ing cannot create internal voids. 
Availability attack include Equipment attacks that aimed at IoT-
based manufacturing equipment. For example, attackers can change 
machine configurations to force the equipment to operate outside its 
tolerance, causing damage to the machine, or accelerating wear and 
tear on the machine.
As shown with the red path in Fig. 6, an attack exploiting a 
vulnerability within the operating system, can apply a malware to 
target a manufacturing machine used in the facility. For instance, a 
structure attack could then affect the integrity of the machine through 
scaling the final product dimensions.
There is a relation between IoT-based manufacturing processes and 
cyber-physical attacks. Some attacks are only possible with the presence 
of certain manufacturing processes. For example, as previously 
mentioned, subtractive manufacturing processes, such as milling or 
turning generally, cannot create internal voids in manufactured parts. 
In contrast, 3D printing’s flexibility makes it vulnerable to many kinds 
of at-tacks, including internal void attacks. 
Table I presents a mapping between common manufacturing 
processes and their corresponding potential attack types. These 
relationships enable us to narrow down the possible attack types based 
on the manufacturing processes being used. In other words, after the 
desired attack type is determined, we can identify which specific 
manufacturing process would be affected; or we might even realize that 
the chosen attack type would not be possible and needs to be altered.
TABLE I. MANUFACTURING PROCESSES  
AND THEIR POTENTIAL ATTACKS.
Manufacturing Process Vulnerability to Attack Types
Milling Scaling, indents/protrusion, vertex movement, surface roughness
Turning Scaling, surface roughness
Drilling Scaling, indents/protrusion, vertex movement, surface roughness
3D printing Scaling, indents/protrusion, vertex movement, internal void, material strength, color
Soldering Material strength
Heat treatment Material strength
Surface finishing Color, surface roughness
D. A Taxonomy of Quality Inspection in IoT-based 
manufactur ing Pro cesses
We now present a second taxonomy of the quality inspection measures 
for manufacturing processes. Quality inspection “are measures aimed at 
checking, measuring, or testing of one or more product characteristics 
and to relate the results to the requirements to confirm compliance” [35]. 
It is an indispensable component in modern manufacturing to ensure 
products meet their quality requirements. Various quality inspection 
measures exist, each with its own pros and cons. For example, dimension 
measurement can detect scaling attacks, though it is ineffective against 
mechanical property attacks. It should just be noted that this quality 
inspection taxonomy has been developed assuming that the digital 
Fig. 6.  Taxonomy of Cyber-Physical Attacks on Manufacturing Systems.
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quality inspec-tion tools are not victims of cyber-physical attacks 
themselves; cyber-physical attacks compromising quality inspec-tion 
tools are beyond the scope of this paper.
Fig. 7 shows our taxonomy of quality inspection for manufacturing 
processes. These quality inspection measures can be applied to either 
the physical or the cyber domains of IoT-based manufacturing. The 
measures applied to the phys-ical domain usually measure the physical 
or mechanical properties of manufacturing parts to assess whether 
the de-sired requirements have been met. Based on the measured 
properties, quality inspection measures are usually non-destructive and 
can be classified into three groups: phys-ical characteristics, mechanical 
properties, and side-channel impacts. quality inspection measures for 
physical characteristics include visual inspection, dimension measure, 
weight measure, 3D laser scanning, X-rays, and CTs.
Mechanical properties refer to how parts behave under load. 
Mechanical properties include, but not limited to, strength (the 
resistance of a material to deformation from an external load), elasticity 
(the ability of a material to return to its original shape after the load is 
removed), and hardness (the ability of a material to resist indentation 
and scratching) [14]. These properties cannot be visually inspected, so 
tests must be run with specialized equipment to analyze these aspects 
of a part. 
Fig. 7. A Taxonomy of Quality Inspection in Manufacturing Processes.
Side-channel impacts are mostly discussed in cryptography and refer 
to cases where attackers do not leverage information from plaintext 
or ciphertext, but from physical characteristics of cryptosystems. 
For instance, hardware has varying power con sumption when doing 
different computations, such as adding and multiplying. By observing 
the power consumption of a cryp tosystem, it is possible to deduce the 
key bits of RSA [19] or even to break the key [20]. Some other side-
channel impacts include timing delays [20], electromagnetic leaks [21], 
tempera ture [22], or radiation [21]. Quality inspection in IoT-based 
manufacturing can meas ure side-channel impacts as well, to determine 
if a manufac tur ing process deviates from its designed specifica tions. 
Quality inspection measures could be also combined with statistical 
analysis techniques since these tests may be expensive, destructive, or 
time consuming. Typical statistical analysis techniques are employed 
based on statistical models, in-cluding Statistical Process Control 
(SPC) [15], Six Sigma [16], acceptance sampling (where samples are 
chosen and analyzed in place of every part) [17], [18], etc. 
In a way, the characteristics being measured are the parts facets, 
since it relates to its performance. Depending on such characteristics, 
linking quality inspection measures with the attack types described in 
Section II. C is important and can help determine which measures are 
effective against different attack types. A subset of the correspondences 
is shown in Table II. Again, cyber-physical attacks on quality inspection 
tools are not considered here.
TABLE II. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACK TYPES AND THEIR QUALITY 
INSPECTION MEASURES.
Attack Type Effective Quality Inspection Measure
Scaling Dimension Measure - Coordinate measure machine 
Vertex movement Dimension Measure - Coordinate measure machine
Indents/protrusion Visual inspection
Internal void X-ray, CT, side-channel information
Material strength Tensile/yield strength test
E. Deducing Attack Threats from Software Vulnerabilities
A common misconception in the cyber-security community is that 
attacks can be avoided by simply employing the latest software versions 
and best practices. However, many IoT sys tems such as manufacturing 
equipment have long lifetimes, prohibitively high upgrade costs and need 
to remains opera tional continuously, and therefore cannot be migrated 
to the latest operat ing systems or manufacturing software versions. A 
key challenge, therefore, is to protect a complex IoT-based manufactur-
ing process built on equipment with buggy or outdated software that 
cannot be easily upgraded to newer and more secure versions.
The cyber infrastructure refers to the computing equipment 
controlling physical manufacturing processes. Each computer equipment 
has several characteristics, such as operating system version (Windows 
XP, Windows 7, etc.), manufacturing software version (CAD, CAM 
software), and network connectivity status (Internet, LAN or None). 
The characteristic of the computers can be mapped to the exploitability 
vectors of vulnerabilities. A vulnerability with an access vector of 
“Internet” will only affects computers with an Internet connection.
To determine what attacks could be launched with known cyber 
vulnerabilities within the cyber infrastructure and what quality 
inspection measures should be taken to detect possible attacks, we 
have connected our attack taxonomy with the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) [23]. The NVD is a U.S. government repository of 
vulnerability management data, which uses the Common Vulnera bility 
Scor ing System (CVSS) [24] to evaluate the severity of vulnerabili-
ties. The CVSS defines a set of metrics to describe the character istics 
of vulnerabilities. The metrics in cludes six vec tors that are described 
below. The first three of these vectors in CVSS are organized in terms 
of exploitability: 
•	 Access Vector (AV) measures an attacker’s ability to success fully 
exploit a vulnerability based on how remote an attacker can be from 
a networking perspective [25]. There are three possible values for 
Access Vector: Local, Adjacent Net work, and Net work. An Access 
Vector of value “Network” (AV: N) means the vulnerability must 
be exploitable without requiring physical (i.e., local) or adjacent 
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network access. Of ten, AV: N vulnerabili ties can be exploited from 
IP addresses on the Inter net. An Access Vector of value “Adjacent 
Net work” means the vulnerability must be exploitable through a 
broadcast or colli sion domain. An Access Vector of value “Lo-
cal” means the vulnerability must only be exploitable via physical 
access, such as proximity to a device or local shell access. 
•	 Access complexity measures the complexity of the attack required 
to exploit the vulnerability after the attacker gained access to the 
target system already [25]. 
•	 Authentication measures the number of times an attacker needs 
to authenticate to the target system to exploit a vulnera bility [25].
The Access Com plexity and Authentication vectors describe the 
degree of difficulty, but not possibility of an attack, which are not 
relevant to our taxonomy, so we omit their discussions here.
Three other vectors in CVSS are organized in term of impact: 
•	 The Confidentiality Metric measures the attacker’s ability to ob tain 
unauthorized access to information from an applica tion or system 
[25]. If no information or data is ex posed due to exploitation, the 
Confidentiality metric receives a value of “None”. If only partial 
information is disclosed due to exploita tion (the attacker cannot 
control what is obtained), the Confidentiality metric receives 
a value of “Partial”. If an at tacker has complete read access to 
all information and data on a system, the Confidentiality metric 
receives a value of “Com plete”. The compromise of confidentiality 
metric means the vulnerability can help attackers gain “read” 
access to the sys tem. The “read” access will make it possible to 
launch confi denti ality attacks that are discussed in Section II.C.
•	 The Integrity Metric measures an attacker’s ability to manipu late 
or remove data from a product or system [25].  There are three 
possible values for this metric: None (I: N), Partial (I: P), and 
Complete (I:C). “None” is used when vulnera bility exploitation 
cannot manipulate data. For exam ple, an information leak only 
exposes information but unau thorized modification is not possible. 
A “Partial” impact to Integrity implies limited or uncontrolled 
modifications to files are possible by exploiting a vulnerability. An 
Integrity metric of “Complete” means an attacker is able to modify 
any system files or data in the system. The compromise of integrity 
metric means the vulnerability can help attackers gain “write” 
access to the system. The “write” access will make it possible to 
launch integrity attacks. Integrity attacks usually need to change the 
critical part of de sign files or machine configurations, a “partial” 
impact is not sufficient because attackers can not make predictable 
changes. The partial value is there fore treated the same as no value. 
•	 The Availability Metric measures an attacker’s ability to disrupt or 
prevent access to services or data [25]. Vulnerabili ties can impact 
availability by affecting hardware, software, and net work resources. 
For example, vulnerabilities can make it possi ble for attackers to 
flood network bandwidth, exhaust CPU or system memory. There 
are three possible values for this metric: None (A: N), Partial (A: 
P), and Complete (A: C). The compro mise of availability metric 
means it is possible to launch availabil ity attacks.
We now examine some vulnerabilities from the NVD to see how 
they can be connected to our proposed taxonomy. As shown in Table 
III, CVE-2014-7268 is a vulnerability whose description is “Buffer 
overflow in AClient in Symantec Deploy ment Solution 6.9 and earlier 
on Windows XP and Server 2003 allows local users to gain privileges 
via unspeci fied vectors.” As shown in Table III, the prerequisites of 
vulnerability CVE-2014-7268 are installa tions of Symantec Deploy-
ment Solution on Windows XP or Server 2003 operation systems and 
local access to the computers involved in the IoT-based manufacturing 
process. If these prerequisites are met, this vulnera bility can be 
exploited to launch attacks that result in “complete” confi dentiality, 
integ rity, and availability im pacts, which means all the attacks in 
our taxon omy shown in Fig. 6 could be launched by exploiting this 
vulnera bility.
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Table III also shows the metrics for vulnerability CVE-2015-2453, 
which is documented as “The Client/Server Run-time Subsystem 
(CSRSS) in Microsoft Win dows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 
and R2 SP1, Win dows 7 SP1, Win dows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 
Server 2012 Gold and R2, and Windows RT Gold and 8.1 allows 
local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application 
that continues to execute during a subsequent user’s login session, 
also known as “Win dows CSRSS Elevation of Privilege Vulnera-
bility”.” This vulnera bil ity just impacts confidentiality, so only confi-
dentiality attacks can be launched and manufacturers need not prepare 
for integrity attacks or availability attacks. Moreover, manufactur ers 
need not do anything if the manufacturing design files are publically 
available, i.e., intentionally not confidential. 
III. casE study
An increasing number of manufacturing companies have em braced 
the Internet of Things to revolutionize the way they manufacture. 
Information technology infrastructure has been used extensively in 
design, manufacturing processes and quality inspection for accessing 
the information of physical objects and for manipulating them. The 
tight integration of hard ware and software enables a more efficient 
production management. While modern manufacturing companies are 
enjoying the benefits the IoT brings, most of them are unaware of the 
potential cyber-security risks they may face.
To demonstrate how our taxonomies can be applied to mod ern 
manu facturing systems to assess cyber-security risks, we visited an 
industry partner to collect related information and map them to our 
approach. This com pany provides additive manu facturing services 
that allow custom ers to submit their own parts designs to facilitate 
production. 
The general process flow of this company is shown in Fig. 8. A 
customer submits parts through a web portal or directly through email 
to a product engineer, who then coordinates with the customer to 
determine the printability and best mate rial/process. The part files (in 
CAD or STL format) will be saved to the network drive. The process 
engineer checks the file for common problems, such as thin walls or 
extra shells, and adjusts the files if necessary. Machines will also be 
checked before printing. After that, the parts will be printed (along with 
witness bars) and will go through quality inspection measures. If the 
parts pass inspection, they will be shipped to customers; otherwise, 
they will be scrapped or reworked.
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The Information Technology (IT) infrastructure in this manufacturing 
company con sists of three categories of computers: engineers’ 
computers, 3D printer computers, and inspection station comput ers. 
Files are stored on a networked server connected to all comput ers. 
There are no restrictions on USB drives and all computers have USB 
access. No personal computers are allowed, but work laptops can be 
taken home and can re motely access the server. Many computers run 
outdated operating systems, including Windows XP and Win dows 7. 
Most computers are connected with the Internet to access the design 
files from network drive. For comput ers without the need to access 
design files, many cannot be unplugged due to the restriction of Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) systems or software activation.
Fig. 8.  General Process Layout of the Manufacturing Company.
This company applies many quality inspection measures, including 
digital file checks, ma chine process checks, material quality checks, 
and part quality checks. Digital file checks verify the STL file and 
determine if there are any inverted normals, holes, or non-closed 
shells. Machine process checks include assessing laser power, IR sen-
sor, or O2 sensor to ensure the machine is operating normally. Material 
quality checks includes checking the powder mix ratio and the melt 
flow index to see the powder batch being used meet the requirements. 
Part quality checks include dimension meas ure, visual inspection, 
and tensile test. Dimension measures are performed with Faro Arm 
(a portable coordinate measuring machine) and manually by calipers. 
Fig. 9.  An Example Product Line.
We applied our taxonomies to conduct a systematic risk assess ment 
for this manufacturing com pany. Fig. 9 shows an example product 
line that consists of a single process: 3D print ing. Vulnerability 
“CVE-2015-2453” presented in Section II.D is an operating system 
vulnerability that will im pact all computers running Windows 7 with 
“com plete” confiden tial impact. Since the project engineer’s com puter 
is running Windows 7 and the STL file is stored in this computer, the 
vulnerability will allow attack ers to launch confi dentiality attacks to 
steal the design files. 
Vulnerability CVE-2014-7268 will impact all the computers 
running Symantec Deploy ment Solution 6.9 or earlier on Win dows XP 
with “complete” confidential ity/integrity/availability impact, which 
means attackers could launch integrity attacks by gaining write access 
to computers controlling 3D printer and inspection station.
IV. rElatEd Work
Prior work has explored various types of security issues in cyber-
physical systems. For example, Cardenas et al. [26] dis cuss key chal-
lenges for securing cyber-physical systems and Sridhar et al. [27] 
model the security risks for the Electric Power Grid. However, they do 
not consider the domain knowledge of manufacturing in their security 
models.
Taxonomies have been proposed for cyber-attacks in Information 
Technology (IT) systems [28], [29]. While the taxono mies are useful 
for manufacturing systems to defend traditional cyber-attacks, these 
taxonomies do not capture the physical effects of the attacks on IoT-
based manufacturing systems. In IoT-based manufacturing systems, 
the attacks on the controlling systems can directly impact the physical 
world. 
Taxonomies have also been proposed for cyber-attacks in the IoT 
systems. For example, Zhu et al. [6] analyze the cyber-attacks on 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems. No equivalent 
taxonomy has been pro posed, however, to systemati cal classify 
possible cyber-physical attacks in manu facturing systems. However, 
no equivalent taxonomy has been proposed in manufacturing.
Integrated circuit manufacturing faces similar security chal lenges 
as cyber-physical manufacturing systems [30]. Taxono mies have been 
developed for hardware Trojans [7], [8], [30], which are maliciously 
injected logic in integrated circuits. Teh ranipoor et al. [7] survey the 
design and taxonomy of hard ware Trojan. Detection methodologies for 
hardware Trojans are also discussed in their survey. Jin et al. [8] present 
different implementations of hardware Trojans and show that traditional 
functional testing can be useless in detecting hardware Trojans. 
Quality inspection in integrated circuits aims to detect if a 
manufactured circuit matches its original design [8]. Since circuits 
cannot be easily deconstructed for testing, side-channel detec tion is 
widely used as a quality inspection measure for defend ing against 
hard ware Trojans. Researchers have developed various side-channel 
methods including timing delays [31], power analy sis [32] for 
detecting hardware Trojans. Cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing 
systems differ from hardware Trojan in that the manufactured parts 
are not elec tronic in nature and there is no computational logic 
to verify the functions; yet some similarities could still exist as 
discussed in [33]. 
Hence, taxonomies to systematical classify possible cyber-physical 
attacks in manufacturing systems and provide a framework to reason 
about the relationship between attack types, processes, equipment and 
quality inspection measures were needed.
V. concludIng rEmarks
The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed many aspects of 
modern manufacturing. IoT-based manufactur ing sys tems, however, 
are much more vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks than traditional 
manufacturing systems. Given the importance of IoT-based 
manufacturing systems throughout the supply chains in modern 
economies, identifying and remediating these vulnerabilities is of 
paramount importance [34].
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To understand potential dangers and protect manufac tur ing sys-
tem safety, this paper presents two taxonomies: one for classifying 
cyber-physical attacks against IoT-based manufactur ing pro cesses 
and another for quality inspection measures for counteract ing these 
attacks. These taxonomies provide guidance for evaluat ing IoT-based 
manufacturing sys tem security by delineat ing the research space and 
helps to codify and relate research approaches to one an other. These 
taxonomies also build connections between IoT-based manufactur ing 
processes, attacks, and quality inspection measures. 
Based on creating our taxonomies and applying them in the context 
of the case study in Section III, we have identified the following 
lessons learned:
•	 Manufactur ing compa nies can benefit from these taxonomies to reason 
more effectively about what possible attacks could happen to their IoT-
based manufacturing pro cess chains, as well as ascertain which quality 
inspection measures are needed to detect defects resulting from cyber-
attacks on IoT-based manufacturing infrastructure.
•	 Ensuring the security of IoT-based manufacturing systems is a 
cross-disciplinary problem that can be solved most effec tively by 
collaborative efforts of researchers from both cyber-security and 
mechanical engineering domains. Moreover, knowledge of cyber-
security should be explained in manufac turing terms to enable 
meaningful reasoning.
•	 There is a tradeoff between quality inspection measure coverage 
and the costs. Enforcing more quality inspection measures can 
examine more aspects of the products, but with a higher cost. Our 
taxonomies can help eliminate quality inspection measures that are 
not necessary and prioritize quality inspection measures that ensure 
quality attributes that requirements manufacturers value the most. 
Now that we have created these taxonomies, our next step is to 
de velop an analysis tool to emulate current IoT-based manu factur ing 
systems. Given IoT-based manufacturing process struc tures, system 
configu rations, and budgets, this analysis tool will pro vide quality 
inspection recommendations on where and how to test. We also plan to 
explore what side-channel infor mation can be uti lized to detect attacks 
and develop algorithms to detect at tacks by processing side-channel 
data in IoT-based manufactur ing pro cesses.
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